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Gauteng’s disaster management clinicians outline 
World Cup shortfalls
A lack of standardised disaster 
management protocols, poor inter-
communication between health care 
authorities and emergency rescue 
services and shaky environmental 
health and port health controls 
threaten Gauteng’s risk preparedness 
for the 2010 World Cup.
This emerged from interviews 
with the top clinicians responsible 
for disaster management at Charlotte 
Maxeke Johannesburg Academic,  Chris 
Hani Baragwanath and Helen Joseph 
hospitals last month.
While making herculean efforts to 
ensure they are as prepared as possible 
by June, the hands-on managers 
admitted that it would take ‘some 
stepping up’ to handle a ‘surge’ beyond 
their current near-peak capacity 
operations on any difficult weekend.
Depending on which public hospital 
Izindaba spoke to, the challenges came 
down to shortages of clinical and 
support staff, equipment, and ICU 
and trauma nursing skills, and budget 
shortfalls.
Off-site 1 - 3-day basic disaster 
management training courses and 
in-house emergency care training have 
helped prepare the less specialised 
health care work force, thanks to 
private health care sector generosity 
and public sector clinical manager 
innovation, respectively. Fortunately 
the veteran clinicians can lean on a 
relatively large body of well-trained 
junior doctors, thanks to the inclusion 
in most medical faculty curricula of 
trauma and emergency medicine and 
the relatively recent registration of 
emergency medicine as a specialty. (The 
first handful of emergency medicine 
specialists qualified in 2007.)
These innovations have now paid 
handsome dividends, putting local 
training in this field well above the 
world average, according to a World 
Health Organization (WHO) survey.
However, on the equipment front, the 
‘Cinderella’ of the Gauteng hospital trio, 
the ageing and under-funded 557-bed 
Helen Joseph (designed as a secondary 
hospital but on the academic training 
circuit), had no manual blood pressure 
machine, one functional ventilator 
and a cannabilised defibrillator in its 
emergency unit at the time of writing. 
Basic patient essentials such as sheets 
and blankets were in short supply, while 
electronic monitoring equipment was 
described as ‘partially functional’.
‘We manage, but it’s not correct 
patient care. If we don’t have the 
equipment in place and additional 
nursing staff appropriately trained 
by June we cannot be accredited – 
but I won’t let that happen,’ said a 
determined Dr Adrienne Wulfsohn.
Wulfsohn was seconded from 
Gauteng Province’s Health Central 
Office in December to upgrade the 
hospital’s disaster planning, and faces 
an uphill battle.
Doctors at Helen Joseph have 
become role models for keeping 
detailed notes ‘to protect our backs’, 
should any adverse events occur. The 
hospital’s clinical director, Dr Geraldine 
Kirby, said the dire shortage of beds, 
particularly ICU beds, lack of support 
and clinical staff and equipment, and 
the poor state of the building were 
major impediments.
‘If we’re hardly coping day to day 
how are we going to cope if World Cup 
surge capacity is required?,’ she asked 
before referring specific enquiries to 
Wulfsohn.
Ambulance diversions; comms 
critical
Wulfsohn put Helen Joseph Hospital on 
‘divert’ (diverting incoming ambulances 
because of lack of overall hospital 
capacity) three times between December 
and early this February.
She explains: ‘First, road construction 
guys working at the hospital entrance 
burst the water main (the city sent 
water tankers and they were re-opened 
within an hour and a half). Then 
we went on divert for 40 minutes 
last week (beginning of February) 
with 7 resuscitations and 8 incoming 
taxi patients – I just didn’t have the 
physical beds to put the patients 
on – but they brought them anyway 
because we were nearest. Because of 
poor communication, suddenly with 
no forewarning, you’re sitting with 7 
resuscitations,’ she explained.
Wulfsohn said she and her staff relied 
on personal cell phones to communicate 
with pre-hospital services and on-call 
colleagues. There were several ‘dead 
(reception) spots’ in the hospital, 
including the resuscitation room (which 
could handle 8 patients at a time).
For optimal communication with 
pre-hospital services she would 
need 4 radios – 1 each for provincial 
authorities, local authorities, the private 
sector and the rescue helicopter. ‘The 
private sector seems to be able to 
standardise more easily but it’s harder 
in the public sector.’
While making herculean 
efforts to ensure they are 
as prepared as possible by 
June, the hands-on managers 
admitted that it would 
take ‘some stepping up’ to 
handle a ‘surge’ beyond their 
current near-peak capacity 
operations on any difficult 
weekend.
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Each local authority also had its own 
call centre linked to various ambulance 
services but did not ‘talk to’ the 
provincial call centre, while none of the 
call centres were directly linked to the 
hospitals (i.e. no radios at hospitals). 
This had serious implications when 
it came to co-ordinating ambulance 
diversions between World Cup-
accredited hospitals and the time-critical 
triage of patients.
A state-of-the-art local government 
disaster management call centre is 
situated in the same building as the 
provincial call centre, yet the two are 
not directly linked.
‘Double triage’ caused alarming 
delays
Wulfsohn, a veteran of 26 years in 
emergency medicine, is adapting 
her hospital triage system to a pre-
hospital one because ‘sometimes I’ve 
found 5 or 6 ambos parked outside the 
hospital with patients, waiting for us to 
re-triage’.
Professor Jacques Goosen, head 
of trauma at the 1 088-bed Charlotte 
Maxeke Johannesburg Academic 
Hospital, said that the ‘vicarious 
violence around taxis, beer and fan 
parks’ far exceeded anything the 
stadiums could throw at their units. Yet 
emergency medicine systems seemed 
to have been designed around the 
stadia ‘while the huge party that goes 
on elsewhere ends up in the public 
hospitals’.
Goosen described the Confederations 
Cup final last year (a Sunday) as having 
provided his hospital with ‘the perfect 
storm’ because of their lack of surge 
capacity at the time. ‘We had 9 patients 
ventilated in casualty and our ICUs 
were full,’ he revealed.
However, a subsequent internal ‘post 
mortem’, which also drew on 3 other 
major trauma-inducing events over the 
past 9 years, had resulted in a disaster 
management plan with regard to which 
clinicians were finally breathing a 
cautious sigh of relief.
‘Our new MEC (Quedani Mahlangu) 
went begging for money for equipment 
that has enabled us to double our 
ventilated beds within a few hours. We 
have 8 ventilated beds and can now 
double and treble that within 6 - 8 hours 
(i.e. stabilised and moved on to ICU or 
high care),’ he explained.
Doctor staffing better, nurse 
availability a problem
An additional boost to their capacity 
was the number of community service 
doctors who had chosen to stay on 
and fill posts which were 50% vacant 
(hospital wide) at the time of the 
Confederations Cup.
‘We’re also starting to fill nursing 
posts – what came out of the post 
mortem was that you can’t call in 
nurses because they stay far away and 
communications are difficult.’
The solution was to call in 20 – 30 
extra nurses in advance on ‘event’ 
days and ‘bad’ weekends and pay 
them overtime to strengthen shifts. The 
resulting cost-benefit ratio meant that 
incoming patients could spend up to 
10 days less in an ICU (1 ICU day costs 
the province R15 000 – the approximate 
cost of 10 nursing shifts). The better 
qualified nurses would be ‘drawn 
down’ from the wards into the ICUs 
while others helped ‘decant’ existing 
non-serious patients to nearby drainage 
hospitals and handled new arrivals.
He confirmed that over the last New 
Year’s weekend Charlotte Maxeke 
Johannesburg Academic Hospital’s 
emergency unit dealt with 52 ‘priority 
1’ (immediate life-threatening injury) 
patients – far more than most reported 
mass casualty events. ‘We called a “code 
yellow” (calling in off-duty trauma 
doctors and nurses) but the matron 
vetoed it because no nurse would arrive 
in time; so we learnt some valuable 
lessons.’
Goosen said that because Gauteng’s 
budget ‘ran out’ towards the end of 
last year, Netcare had stepped in to put 
as many public sector GPs as possible 
from all provincial hospitals through 
a licensed Major Incident Medical 
Management course.
The Department of Medicine at Wits 
University had also put 150 doctors 
through its emergency medicine course, 
training them in managing mass 
casualties.
Private and NGO sector to the 
rescue
‘Apart from that there are a lot of major 
in-house training initiatives at the 
major public hospitals, so with limited 
support from government we’ve got a 
lot of people trained,’ he added. Goosen 
said that without the private and NGO 
sectors the region’s hospitals would be 
disastrously under-prepared.
Charlotte Maxeke Johannesburg 
Academic is also increasing the number 
of available theatre nurses so that 
the hospital can run up to 5 theatres 
instead of the current 3. Credit was due 
to a former clinician at the hospital, 
West Indian Dr Ricardo Hamilton, 
who had completed his MMed thesis 
on improving the hospital’s disaster 
management systems. Hamilton 
analysed the factors causing closure of 
the hospital’s trauma unit in 2007, the 
hospital’s experience of the April 2001 
Ellis Park Soccer Stadium stampede 
(146 patients treated in just over 2 hours 
with no mortalities), the East Rand 
xenophobic violence of 17 - 18 May 
2008 (24 patients ventilated, 56  priority 
1 and 150 priority 2 - 3 handled in 48 
hours), the patient influx during the 
Confederations Cup final, and last New 
Year’s eve. ‘That all showed exactly 
how badly prepared we were … that 
we could run a trauma service but not a 
system, while the Confed Cup showed 
us that we lacked surge capacity. 
Hamilton told us why this was and 
what to do about it.’
Dr Frank Plani, deputy trauma chief 
and principal surgeon at the 2 800-bed 
Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital, was 
putting the finishing touches to his 
disaster plan.
With a brand-new, well-equipped 
trauma unit where the official 8-bed 
capacity has already been pushed 
to 15, a resuscitation room capable 
of ventilating up to 32 patients, and 
another 6-bed medical resuscitation 
room, he has a platform to build on.
The most important finding of his 
disaster and resuscitation research (part 
Goosen said that without 
the private and NGO sectors 
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of a thesis he’s writing), is that ‘we’d 
not be able to respond in the hospital 
disaster phase without a large number 
of nurses’ – and that mobilising them is 
a problem.
Plani cited last New Year’s eve 
when they mobilised all their available 
doctors to deal with 35 resuscitation 
patients at once while another 50 
patients waited outside.
‘We had just 4 trauma-trained nurses 
whose mobilisation was a problem, 
but we supplemented them with less 
suitably trained ones, I can’t remember 
the exact numbers,’ he confessed.
Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital 
would this June ‘double up on 
everybody, nurses in theatre, basically 
everybody works double shift on the 
few days that the World Cup affects 
us directly’. They were head hunting 
senior nurses who worked at Bara 
during the 1984/1985 riots to help 
prioritise the most needed equipment, 
but corporate sponsorship would be 
essential to secure it.
His plan includes basic disaster packs 
attached to 8 dedicated specialised 
trolleys, each with a doctor and 
volunteer, working in rotation with 
dedicated junior nurses doing theatre 
hand-overs for continuity of care. ‘We’re 
busy with a skills audit and have taken 
all our surgeons through ultrasound 
and EM courses,’ he added.
Plani said the main difference 
between Chris Hani Baragwanath 
and Charlotte Maxeke Johannesburg 
Academic was that the latter had ‘finite 
space’, while his hospital had ‘almost 
unlimited space but fewer resources’. 
‘So for hundreds of patients we’ll adopt 
a “treat as you find” (pre-hospital) 
approach with triage in a big parking 
lot next to the entrance while our huge 
outpatient department takes all the 
walking wounded.’ He presented his 
disaster plan to the hospital executive 
and their CEO in early February and 
they ‘seemed very keen on it’.
What about medical 
emergencies?
The hospital disaster chiefs were less 
confident about what would happen 
should a large-scale medical emergency 
coincide with the expected trauma 
surge, and some pointed to port control 
and environmental health weaknesses 
in Government.
Wulfsohn said VIPs were ironically 
among the biggest port control health 
safety threats as they were given 
special dispensation on yellow fever 
vaccination certificates that enabled 
them to receive a vaccination only upon 
entering the country.
This was in spite of the required 
10-day - 2-week post-immunisation 
waiting period. 
‘Will soccer teams also be considered 
VIPs?,’ she asked pointedly.
Dr Patrick Moonasar, director of 
malaria and other vector-borne diseases, 
responded that all international 
health requirements would be ‘strictly 
complied with’.
Any VIP exceptions to this held the 
potential to ‘open up a can of worms for 
everybody else’.
‘However, we live in the real world 
and if we have a head of state or 
other such VIP from any endemic area 
(arriving unvaccinated), a top-level 
political decision will have to be made 
based on their value to us and then 
strict surveillance instituted.’
Identical surveillance would 
be imposed on any passenger for 
whom a required vaccination was 
contraindicated. ‘But these would be 
absolute exceptions to the rule,’ he 
emphasised.
Dr Peter Fuhri, national disaster 
management co-ordinator, said all 
air and maritime carriers were being 
asked to tighten up passenger health 
questionnaires and to notify South 
African authorities well in advance of 
any ‘unwell’ passengers. Environmental 
health staff training and numbers 
would be beefed up at all ports of 
entry and supplemented by Centre for 
Disease Control staff. The WHO would 
deploy a disease surveillance expert to 
the national health department for the 
duration of the World Cup.
Disease outbreak response protocols 
had been reviewed and outbreak 
teams had received extra training 
while pre-event inspections of all fan 
parks and public viewing areas were 
being undertaken by the responsible 
municipal health services.
He said the chief lessons learnt from 
the Confederations Cup included a need 
for tightening up command and control 
structures and ensuring better and more 
specific stadia access accreditation for 
relevant medical and health support 
staff.
Patient delivery to relevant hospitals 
(there is a grading system with FIFA 
officials and other VIPs, those with 
travel insurance and medical aids 
assigned to various private hospitals 
and others to public hospitals) would 
be determined by the manager in the 
relevant provincial emergency medical 
services communications centre.
Responding to the surge capacity 
concerns of his Gauteng public hospital 
colleagues, Fuhri replied: ‘That’ll 
always be a difficult one. Nobody in 
their right mind thinks public hospitals 
can be transformed overnight or even 
in 3 years. 2010 is not the answer. We 
just have to be intelligent in terms of 
strategies – and they’re doing that.’
Professor Goosen summed up 
preparedness sentiment thus: ‘As South 
Africans we always seem to do stuff at 
the very last minute, but I think we’re 
getting our emergency plans right at 
last.’
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‘However, we live in the 
real world and if we have a 
head of state or other such 
VIP from any endemic area 
(arriving unvaccinated), a 
top-level political decision 
will have to be made based 
on their value to us and 
then strict surveillance 
instituted.’
Patients being prepared for transfer to the ICU 
at Johannesburg General Hospital.
